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Abstract
This paper develops a limit-cycle-based theory of debt fluctuations through a simple endoge-
nous growth model. Public debt and deficit are introduced by relaxing the balanced-budget
rule hypothesis, and assuming a simple fiscal rule. Our main result is that fiscal rules can
be destabilizing, leading to (i) multiple equilibria—four balanced-growth paths can emerge—,
(ii) endogenous public debt cycles, which appear both in the short and the long run, and (iii)
hysteresis phenomena arising from extreme sensitivity of changes in parameters. We also reveal
that a balanced-budget rule does not preclude large aggregate fluctuations. Finally, our cali-
bration exercise highlights that our model produces asymmetric cycles consistent with observed
stylized facts.
Keywords: Fiscal rules; Indeterminacy; Limit cycle; Public Debt; Bifurcation.
1. Introduction
The public-debt-to-GDP ratio is characterized by oscillating fluctuations, both in
developed and developing countries. Based on historical time series, public debt paths
follow long-lasting and regular cycles (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010; Abbas et al., 2011;
Poghosyan, 2015). In pioneer works, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, 2011) analyzed episodes
of debt cycles for 70 countries spanning an exceptionally long time period, and concluded
that “public debt follows a lengthy and repeated boom-bust cycle”. Between 1880 and 2009,
Abbas et al. (2011) identified regular debt cycles, with a total of 66 episodes of debt
decline and 63 episodes of debt increase. Focusing on the 1950-2015 period (IMF data),
the HP-detrended cyclical component of the public-debt-to-GDP ratio for developed and
developing countries (see Figures 1a-2a) and its spectral density (see Figures 1b-2b)
highlight the presence of debt cycles of a certain regularity, around 12 (20) years for
developing (developed) countries.2
1Corresponding author: alexandru.minea@uca.fr
2This is consistent with Poghosyan (2015), who shows that debt cycles during the period 1960-2014
last about 13 years.
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Figure 1: Cyclical Component and Spectral Densities for Developed Countries
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Figure 2: Cyclical Component and Spectral Densities for Developing Countries
Long-lasting theoretical explanations of debt cycles lay on exogenous factors, such
as wars or majors recessions, as in the tax-smoothing theory of Barro (1979) and Bohn
(1998). However, this exogenous-shock-based perspective does not adequately replicate
the regularity and frequency of observed cycles, especially in peacetime periods. In this
paper, we suggest that debt cycles have endogenous origins where boom and bust are
tightly linked. In this case, the internal mechanisms of the economy are sufficient to
generate fluctuations even in absence of any stochastic shocks.
The main argument we develop is that a simple deficit rule can generate long-lasting
public debt cycles, driven by the interaction between the optimal saving behaviour of
households and the government’s budget constraint, without the need of exogenous per-
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turbations. Such cycles can appear both in the short and long run through the occurrence
of limit-cycles and complex dynamics.
In light of the existing literature, little is known regarding the implications of fiscal
deficits for aggregate fluctuations. Preceding studies rest so far on a balanced-budget
rule, and do not account for public debt. Yet, the persistence of public deficits and debt
characterizes most developed countries since the mid-1970.3 In addition, starting the
1980s, many economies adopted fiscal rules constraining deficit and/or debt. 4 As such,
assessing the impact of deficit rules on endogenous fluctuations is a major challenge facing
economic theory.
This paper addresses this challenge. For reporting on the continuous growth of public
debt in the long run, we build a Romer (1986)-type endogenous growth model, with en-
dogenous labor supply, in the spirit of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) (hereafter, SGU).5
Public debt and deficit are introduced by relaxing the balanced-budget rule hypothesis,
and assuming a simple fiscal rule characterized by a constant deficit-to-output ratio. The
study of the dynamics of the economy, both analytically and using a graphical analysis,
reveals the occurrence of local and global bifurcations.
Our results are as follows.
First, our model exhibits multiplicity of equilibria. Consistent with US or OECD
historical data, our calibration shows that four equilibria can appear: two high-growth
equilibria, a low-growth trap, and a “catastrophic” equilibrium in which the economy
disappears. Intuitively, this multiplicity comes from two non-monotonic relations between
consumption and public debt. The first relation is driven by the government’s budget
constraint. Any increase in debt generates a rise in taxes leading to a crowding-out effect
on output and growth; if this crowing-out effect is low (high), consumption and public
debt are positively (negatively) linked, hence the first non-monotonic relationship. The
second relation comes from the behavior of households. Any increase in public debt
reduces both output and the real interest rate, exerting an adverse effect on consumption
and on the inducement to save; depending on parameters, consumption can increase or
decline, hence the second non-monotonic relationship.
Second, endogenous public debt cycles can emerge in the neighborhood of the low-
3The deficit-to-GDP ratio was around 2.5% on average in OECD countries in the period 1970-2005,
and this ratio increased since the Great Recession (according to the 2017 IMF’s World Economic Outlook,
average general government gross debt in ratio of GDP in developed countries rose from around 72% in
2007 to roughly 103% in 2019; and the imbalances triggered by the public debt were at the core of the
2012 Eurozone debt crisis).
4Among all types of fiscal rules, debt and deficit rules were enacted in more than 60 countries by 2012,
namely roughly three times more than expenditure rules, and more than six times more than revenue
rules (see Schaechter et al., 2012; Combes et al., 2017).
5In exogenous growth setups, public debt is only transitory—see the section 3 in SGU. With en-
dogenous growth, in contrast, public debt can grow in the long run; see, e.g. Minea and Villieu (2012),
Boucekkine et al. (2015), Nishimura et al. (2015), Menuet et al. (2018), Cheron et al. (2019), among
others.
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growth trap. These cycles are (locally) stable for a range of parameter values through the
occurrence of a (supercritical) Hopf bifurcation. This implies that a small perturbation
of a parameter would not remove debt cycles. We show that these limit-cycles get larger
as the deficit target is reduced. At the limit, long-lasting endogenous fluctuations can
take the form of a homoclinic orbit, which defines a path that joins a steady-state to
itself. From a global dynamics perspective, the existence of such an orbit is ensured by
the occurrence of a generic Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcation.
Third, fiscal rules can generate hysteresis and extreme sensitivity to changes in pa-
rameters. For small changes in the deficit-to-output ratio, the steady-state warps in a
non-reversible way through the occurrence of a Cusp bifurcation : a tight deficit ratio
may irreversibly condemn the economy to a low-growth/high-debt trap. Consequently, a
balanced-budget rule does not preclude large aggregate fluctuations.
Quantitatively, our calibration exercise reveals the realism of our findings. The dif-
ferent (local and global) bifurcations occur for reasonable values of economic growth and
public-debt ratio, and the asymmetric cycles that our model produces, with long peri-
ods of nearby-stationary growth and sudden short-living recessions, is consistent with
observed stylized facts. Thus, our model can roughly replicate long-lasting fluctuations
by endogenous mechanisms, reducing the need for exogenous shocks.
All in all, our analysis illustrates the perils of fiscal rules. Fiscal rules—including
the balanced-budget rule, hereafter BBR—can lead to indeterminacy, multiple equilib-
ria, and public debt cycles, with undesirable consequences on economic growth. These
features arise in our general macroeconomic setup with standard assumptions, and are
confirmed by calibration. Although stylized, our setup addresses major long-lasting topics
in macroeconomics.
From a theoretical perspective, our paper is close to a rich and expanding literature
aiming at identifying the different channels of fiscal policy-driven (in)determinacy. These
channels can be roughly divided into three categories. The first one relates to the way
taxes are modeled; examples include taxes on consumption, instead of labor (Giannit-
sarou, 2007), or progressive taxation (Christiano and Harrison, 1999). Second, the way
public spending are modeled is also of importance; growth- or utility-enhancing, instead
of wasteful public spending, can either support determinacy (Chen, 2006) or indetermi-
nacy (Guo and Harrison, 2008, with exogenous growth, and Palivos et al., 2003; Park
and Philippopoulos, 2004 with endogenous growth). Third, the (de)stabilizing effects of
fiscal policy may significantly differ depending on alternative assumptions on taxes and
public spending.6
With respect to this literature, we adopt wasteful public spending, endogenous flat-
6Such departures include non-separable utility function (Linnemann, 2008; Nourry et al., 2013; Abad
et al., 2017), CES production function (Guo and Lansing, 2009; Ghilardi and Rossi, 2014), or two-sector
models (Nishimura et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2015).
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rate taxes on endogenous labor, and an additive utility function, as in SGU. Therefore,
our (in)determinacy results are not triggered by the channels previously emphasized.
On the methodological side, moving from exogenous to endogenous growth dramatically
changes SGUs conclusions regarding the effects of labor taxes. Indeed, their findings must
be amended on two grounds: (i) aggregate instability only occurs if public spending is
high, and (ii) our aggregate-instability result covers a broader class of mechanisms than
in SGU, because it may rely on local and global indeterminacy.
Importantly, in the existing literature, global indeterminacy comes from positive ex-
ternalities associated to increasing returns or two-sector frameworks. In contrast, in our
model, global indeterminacy is established in a one-sector model, and does not fundamen-
tally rest on increasing returns in production. Instead, it rather resorts to the non-trivial
dynamics of the debt-to-capital ratio that give rise to complex interactions between the
government’s budget constraint and the households’ saving behavior. Against this back-
ground, although based on a one-sector model, indeterminacy does not depend on the
famous Benhabib-Farmer condition (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994), namely that the in-
creasing labor demand must be positively sloped and steeper than the labor supply. 7 In
our model with constant returns-to-scale and decreasing returns in all private factors,
the labor demand is a decreasing function of the wage, but nonetheless consistent with
indeterminacy.8
From a policy perspective, the main message of our paper is that fiscal rules can
be destabilizing, because they open the door for multiple equilibria and complex cyclical
dynamics. This finding may be related to empirical studies that highlight the destabilizing
role of fiscal rules due to pro-cyclical biases of fiscal policy in reaction to adverse supply
or demand shocks (see, e.g. Alt and Lowry, 1994; Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996; Fata´s and
Mihov, 2006, among others). In our paper, however, the destabilizing effect of fiscal rules
is not based on inadequate responses to exogenous shocks but on endogenous fluctuations
resulting from a tight deficit target.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, section 3 analyzes
the steady-state, section 4 performs a calibration exercise, section 5 studies local and
global dynamics, section 6 discusses public debt cycles, section 7 extends our results to
balanced-budget rules, and section 8 concludes the paper.
7The survey of Benhabib and Farmer (1999) provides a thorough discussion of this condition.
8Technically, our paper is also related to applications of the Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcation in
economics. By applying the result of Kopell and Howard (1975) in a monetary model, Benhabib et al.
(2001) first used this bifurcation to prove the destabilizing role of Taylor rules. Subsequent works
employed the BT bifurcation to demonstrate the occurrence of Beveridge cycles (Sniekers, 2018), or
homoclinic orbits in growth models (Benhabib et al., 2008, with exogenous growth and variable capacity
utilization, and Mattana et al., 2009, with endogenous growth and two-sectors). In our paper, the BT
bifurcation serves to prove the existence of homoclinic orbits associated with large public debt cycles.
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2. The model
We consider a simple continuous-time endogenous-growth model with N representa-
tive individuals and a government. Each representative agent consists of a household and
a competitive firm. All agents are infinitely-lived and have perfect foresight. Popula-
tion is constant, and we denote individual quantities by lower case letters and aggregate
quantities by corresponding upper case letters, namely X = Nx for all variable X.
2.1. Households
The representative household starts at the initial period with a positive stock of
capital (k0), and chooses the path of consumption {ct}t≥0, hours worked {lt}t≥0, and
capital {kt}t>0, such as to maximize the present discount value of its lifetime utility,
which is assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure9
U =
∞∫
0
e−ρt {u(ct)− v(lt)} dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. We consider a logarithm utility function
(u(ct) = log(ct)), and preferences for leisure are such that v(lt) =
B
1+ε
l1+εt , where ε ≥ 0
is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution in labour, and B > 0 a scale
parameter.
Households use labor income (wtlt, where wt is the hourly wage rate) and capital
revenues (qtkt, where qt is the rental rate of capital), to consume (ct), invest (k˙t), and
buy government bonds (dt), which return the real interest rate rt. They pay taxes on
wages (τtwtlt, where τt is the wage tax rate), on consumption (τctct, where τct is the
tax rate on consumption), and perceive (positive or negative) lump-sum transfers πt (in
equilibrium, πt is the share Πt/N of total lump-sump transfer Πt); hence the following
budget constraint
k˙t + d˙t = rtdt + qtkt + (1− τt)wtlt − (1 + τct)ct + πt. (2)
The first order conditions for the maximization of the household’s programme give
rise to the dynamic Euler relation (with qt = rt in competitive equilibrium)
c˙t
ct
= rt − ρ− τ˙ct
1 + τct
, (3)
and to the static relation
(1− τt)wt
(1 + τct)ct
= Blεt . (4)
9The use of a separable utility function allows neutralizing an important source of indeterminacy in
the form of non-separable preferences (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001; Nourry et al., 2013).
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Eq. (3) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule that governs intertemporal consumption
choices, here in the presence of varying consumption taxes. Eq. (4) shows that, at each
period t, the marginal gain of hours worked (the net real wage (1 − τt)wt, expressed
in terms of marginal utility of consumption, including the effect of consumption taxes
1/((1 + τct)ct)), just equals the marginal cost (Bl
ε
t ).
Finally, the optimal path of consumption has to verify the set of transversality con-
ditions
lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) u′ (ct) kt} = 0 and lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) u′ (ct) dt} = 0,
ensuring that lifetime utility U is bounded.10
2.2. Firms
Output (yt) is produced using a constant returns-to-scale technology with a knowledge
externality, namely yt = A˜h
α
t k
1−α
t , where ht and kt respectively stand for human and
physical capital, A˜ > 0 is a scale parameter, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output to
human capital.
Human capital is produced both by raw labor (or training activity) lt, and by the
economy-wide stock of knowledge Xt that generates positive technological spillovers onto
firms’ productivity (as Romer, 1986), namely ht = Xtlt. We assume that knowledge is
produced by a simple Cobb-Douglas technology depending on aggregate levels of physical
and human capital: Xt = H
β
t K
1−β
t , where β ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of human capital
efficiency in the accumulation of knowledge. At aggregate level, we then obtain Ht =
KtL
1/(1−β)
t = KtL
1+φ
t , with 1 + φ = 1/(1− β) ≥ 1.11
The production function exhibits constant returns-to-scale at the individual level, and
decreasing returns in all private factors. The first order conditions for profit maximization
(relative to private factors) are
wt = α
yt
lt
, (5)
rt = (1− α)yt
kt
. (6)
At the aggregate level, the knowledge externality will allow reaching an endogenous
growth path, because the social return of capital is not decreasing. Effectively, the ag-
gregate production function is
Yt = A˜KtL
α(1+φ)
t . (7)
10On the BGP associated to constant growth and interest rates (γ∗ and r∗, respectively), these transver-
sality conditions correspond to the no-Ponzi game constraint γ∗ < r∗. This condition ensures that public
debt will be repaid in the long run, and does not preclude the possibility that γ > r in the short run.
11Human capital externalities, i.e. the fact that your coworkers’ human capital makes you more
productive, are well documented in empirical literature (see, e.g. Rauch, 1993; Moretti, 2004, who find
very significant estimates of human capital externalities). Alternative models of endogenous growth,
based on the Lucas (1988) archetype, consider the formation of human capital through individual training
decisions that compete with productive activities.
7
As we will see in section 4, devoted to the quantitative assessment of our results,
the main results of this paper appear even if the aggregated returns-to-scale are close to
constant (i.e. 1 + α(1 + φ) close to one).
2.3. The government
The government provides public expenditure Gt and total transfers Πt, levies taxes,
and borrows from households. The fiscal deficit is financed by issuing debt (D˙t); hence,
the following budget constraint
D˙t = rtDt + Gt + Πt − τtwtLt − τctct. (8)
We shall assume that the government (i) claims a part g of aggregate output for public
spending (Gt = gYt),
12 (ii) retrieves a part μ of aggregate output from consumption taxes
net from lump-sum transfers (τctct − Πt = μYt), and (iii) fixes a constant tax rate on
consumption (τct = τc < 1).
At this stage, there are three exogenous parameters (g, μ, and τc) and two endogenous
policy instruments in Eq. (8): public debt (Dt), and the tax rate on wages (τt). To close
the model, one instrument has to be exogenously specified. To this end, we suppose that
the government follows a fiscal rule characterized by a constant deficit-to-output ratio,
namely13
D˙t
Yt
= θ. (9)
In this way, the tax-rate on wages will serve to adjust the government’s budget constraint,
as in SGU.
The deficit target θ ≥ 0 is consistent with current institutional frameworks (for ex-
ample, a 3% deficit ceiling was adopted by the EU, the West African Economic and
Monetary Union, or the East African Community, see IMF, 2018). As we will see, Eq.
(9) conveys the main message of the paper in a direct and transparent way: a basic
fiscal rule (including the balanced budget rule—BBR—, θ = 0) may have destabilizing
effects, because the interaction between the households’ optimal saving behavior and the
government’s budget constraint opens the door to indeterminacy and complex dynamics,
including long-run public debt cycles.
2.4. Equilibrium
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all household-firm behave similarly.
12As in SGU, public expenditure has no effect on utility or production (i.e. wasteful public spending).
For a recent model with productive expenditure, see, e.g. Menuet et al. (2018).
13Such a deficit rule is discussed in Menuet et al. (2018). We can also specify a gradual rule δ˙t =
η(θ − δt), with δt = D˙t/Yt, and η > 0 a parameter reflecting the speed of adjustment of the deficit
ratio to its long-run target. Such a rule does not qualitatively change our results. The fiscal rule (9)
corresponds to η = +∞, i.e. δt = θ.
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Definition 1. A symmetric competitive equilibrium is a path {Ct, Lt, Kt, Dt, Yt}∞0 that
solves Eqs. (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), and satisfies the set of transversality conditions and
the IS equilibrium K˙t = Yt − Ct −Gt.
To find endogenous growth solutions, we deflate all growing variables by the capital
stock to obtain long-run stationary ratios, namely (we henceforth omit time indexes):
yk := Y/K, ck := C/K, and dk = D/K.
Given the fiscal rule (9), the tax rate on wages is the adjustment variable in the
government’s budget constraint. Using Eqs. (5), (6), (8) and (9), it follows that
τ =
(1− α)dk + g − μ− θ
α
= 1−
(
dˉ− (1− α)dk
α
)
, (10)
where dˉ = α + μ + θ − g.
Assumption 1. (1− α)dk < dˉ < α + (1− α)dk
Assumption 1 ensures that τ ∈ (0, 1). From (4), (6), and (7), we obtain the equilibrium
level of output
yk = A
(
α(1− τ)
ck
)ψ
, (11)
where ψ := α(1+φ)
1+ε−α(1+φ) , and A := A˜
(
A˜Nε
B(1+τc)
)ψ
.
Assumption 2 (Normal labor demand) α(1 + φ) < 1.
Assumption 2 is a sufficient (unnecessary) condition for ψ > 0, and is verified under
the plausible condition β < 1 − α. Under Assumption 2, labor demand is normal, i.e.
decreasing with real wages.14 This is an important feature, because our indeterminacy
results do not rest on a positively-sloped labor-demand curve, contrasting with Benhabib
and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994).15
14Indeed, from (5) and (7), the aggregate labor demand writes Lt = [ wt(1−α)A˜Kt ]
1/(α(1+φ)−1).
15In Benhabib and Farmer, 1994, p.30, a necessary condition for indeterminacy is that (using our
notations): α(1 + φ) > 1 + ε. This implies that the aggregate labor demand has to be increasing with
real wages (see Eqs. (5) and (7) with α(1 + φ)− 1 > ε ≥ 0). For the labor demand to slope up with real
wages, increasing returns must be important, as discussed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (1997). In our model, as we have seen, we assume α(1+φ) < 1 < 1+ε, such that labor
demand is normal, i.e. decreasing with real wages. We nevertheless obtain indeterminacy, thanks to the
public debt dynamics. In addition, in our model, indeterminacy is consistent with lowly-increasing social
returns, as illustrated by our quantitative analysis in section 4 (see Benhabib and Farmer, 1999, for a
synthesis of several ways to obtain indeterminacy with small increasing returns).
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The inverse relationship between the consumption ratio and the output ratio in Eq
(11) comes from the labor market equilibrium (4). Following an increase in the consump-
tion ratio, the marginal utility of consumption decreases, thus inducing households to
substitute leisure for working hours (since ε ≥ 0, leisure and consumption are comple-
ment in equilibrium). Then, the equilibrium labor supply and output are reduced. The
same result arises if the tax rate on wages increases.
With constant consumption taxes, the optimal aggregate consumption behaviour is,
from (3) and (6),
C˙
C
= (1− α)yk − ρ, (12)
and the path of the capital stock is given by the goods market equilibrium
K˙
K
= (1− g)yk − ck. (13)
The path of public debt follows the definition of the deficit ratio, namely
D˙
D
= θ
yk
dk
. (14)
Hence, the reduced-form of the model is obtained by Eqs. (12), (13) and (14)
c˙k
ck
= (g − α)yk − ρ + ck,
d˙k
dk
=
θyk
dk
− (1− g)yk + ck,
(15)
where, from Eqs. (10) and (11)
yk = A
(
dˉ− (1− α)dk
ck
)ψ
=: yk(ck, dk). (16)
In equilibrium, any increase in the debt ratio (dk) reduces the output ratio (yk).
Indeed, the growing interest-burden of public debt leads to more taxes on wages, which
discourages labor supply. The same crowding-out effect applies in case of an increase in
public spending or a decrease in the deficit target, through coefficient dˉ.
Definition 2. A steady-state i is a symmetric competitive equilibrium where consump-
tion, capital, output, and public debt grow at the common (endogenous) rate γi, such
that c˙k = d˙k = 0 in (15). At any steady state i, the economy is characterized by a
balanced-growth path (BGP): γi := C˙/C = K˙/K = Y˙ /Y = D˙/D, while the real interest
rate (ri) is constant.
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We determine the steady-state solutions of the model in section 3, section 4 provides
a quantitative assessment, and section 5 discusses local and global dynamics.
3. Long-run solutions and the deficit target
In this section, we consider strictly positive deficit targets (θ > 0).16 The long-run
endogenous growth solutions are described by two relations between ck and dk. The first
one is the c˙k = 0 locus, which comes from the Euler relation (12) and the IS equilibrium
(13)
d∗k =
1
1− α
{
dˉ− c∗k
(
ρ− c∗k
(g − α)A
)1/ψ}
, (17)
where a star denotes steady-state values.
The second relation is the d˙k = 0 locus, related to the government’s budget constraint
(8), and the deficit rule (9)
θyk(c
∗
k, d
∗
k) = [(1− g)yk(c∗k, d∗k)− c∗k]d∗k. (18)
Steady-state solutions are obtained as the crossing-point of Eqs. (17) and (18).
Theorem 1. The long-run equilibria are characterized by the following regimes.
• Regime L (low public spending): g < α. There are two positive-growth candidates
for a steady-state: a high-growth solution (point P) and a low-growth solution (point
M).
• Regime H (high public spending): g > α. There are three positive-growth candidates
for a steady-state (points M , P and Q), and a no-growth degenerate solution (point
D).
Proof. First, Eq. (17) corresponds to d∗k = dk(c
∗
k). There are two cases. On the one hand,
if g < α, we have d′k(c
∗
k) < 0, ∀c∗k > ρ, hence a monotonic decreasing relation between c∗k
and d∗k. On the other hand, if g > α, we have d
′
k(c
∗
k) < 0 if c
∗
k ∈ [0, cˆk), and d′k(c∗k) > 0 if
c∗k ∈ (cˆk, ρ), where
cˆk =
ψρ
1 + ψ
, (19)
hence a U-shaped curve in the (ck, dk)-plane, with a minimum at cˆk.
Second, Eq. (18) leads to c∗k = ck(d
∗
k), where
ck(d
∗
k) =
{
A
d∗k
[
dˉ− (1− α)d∗k
]ψ
[(1− g)d∗k − θ]
}1/(1+ψ)
, (20)
16The balanced-budget rule (BBR) case is studied in section 7.
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hence c′k(d
∗
k) ≥ 0 ⇔ −(d∗k)2ψ(1 − α)(1 − g) − d∗kθ(1 − α)(1 − ψ) + θdˉ ≥ 0. Focusing on
d∗k ≥ 0, ck(∙) depicts a bell-shaped curve in the (dk, ck)-plane, with a maximum at
dˆk :=
√
(1− α)θ[θ(1− α)(1− ψ)2 + 4ψ(1− g)dˉ]− θ(1− α)(1− ψ)
2ψ(1− α)(1− g) ≥ 0.
Notice that, for small deficit targets (the term θ(1 − α)(1 − ψ) is small enough, see our
calibrations in section 4), this maximum can be approximated by
dˆk ≈
√
θdˉ
ψ(1− g)(1− α) . (21)
We define cˉk as the maximal consumption ratio, namely cˉk := ck(dˆk). If θ = 0, this value
corresponds to cˉk = [Adˉ
ψ(1− g)]1/(1+ψ).
3a: Regime L (g < α) 3b: Regime H2 (g > α)
Figure 3: The steady states
In Regime L (g < α), there are at most two BGPs (P and M , as in Figure 3a). As
θ increases, the curve c˙k = 0 moves upwards (see Eq. 17), while the curve d˙k = 0 moves
backwards (see Eq. 20). Hence, there is a critical value θˉ, such that points the P and
M collide, defining a saddle-node bifurcation : for slightly higher values of θ, there is no
equilibrium.
In Regime H (g > α), four BGPs are feasible, as in Figure 3b. A trivial solution,
denoted by point D, is associated with c∗k = 0 =: c
D
k and d
∗
k = dˉ/ (1− α) := dDk (in this
case, we have yDk = 0). The couple (c
D
k , d
D
k ) is such that the economy asymptotically
vanishes. We will refer to this solution as close to the “harrodian” perspective. Although
such a “collapse” solution is not economically attractive, it cannot be rejected without
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assessing the local and global dynamics of the model, as we will see.17 The areas for
which the different positive-growth candidates emerge (or not) as steady-state solutions
are discussed in the following subsection. ¤
3.1. Behaviour of Regime H
Figure 4 depicts the different configurations of long-run equilibria. The most general
case is Regime H3 (Figure 4e), in which the two steady-state curves intersect four times,
at points Q, P , M , and D. The associated BGPs are such that 0 = γD < γM < γP < γQ,
corresponding to the inverse ranking of the public debt ratio dQk < d
P
k < d
M
k < d
D
k .
Regime H3 occurs only if cˆk < cˉk, where cˆk and cˉk respectively correspond to the leftmost
point of c˙k = 0 and to the maximum of d˙k = 0, and we focus on this configuration in the
following.18
Ignoring point D for the moment, the areas of structural invariance are located on
either sides of the two saddle-node global bifurcations that surround Regime H3. At
the first bifurcation, labelled SN1 (Figure 4d), points P and M collide. For a small
change in parameters, the economy switches from Regime H3 into Regime H1, which
is characterized by a unique BGP (point Q in Figure 4a). At the second bifurcation,
labelled SN2 (Figure 4f), the situation is symmetric: points P and Q collide, such that
for a small change in parameters, the economy switches from Regime H3 into Regime
H2, where point M is the unique BGP (Figure 4c). The two saddle-node bifurcations
eventually collide for some parameters’ values, defining a CUSP point, such that steady-
states M , P , and Q merge (Figure 4b). In this case, Regime H3 vanishes, and the long-run
solution is unique. For any arbitrarily small change in parameters, on both sides of this
CUSP bifurcation, the number of long-run solutions goes from one to three. As we will
see, this CUSP bifurcation may generate hysteresis.
Our quantitative illustration of the model highlights that these different configurations
are realistic. In section 4 below, using policy instruments θ and g as parameters of interest,
we show that all types of bifurcations are consistent with OECD or US historical data.
17Households’ preferences are defined only for ct > 0, but the steady state D can be asymptotically
reached with limt→+∞ ct = 0+.
18If cˆk > cˉk, Regime H3 cannot appear, since only two BGPs are feasible: points Q and D in Regime
H1, or points M and D in Regime H2. Since these regimes also appear if cˆk < cˉk, we can restrict our
analysis to this configuration (the alternative configuration cˆk > cˉk will be extensively addressed in the
BBR case, in section 7).
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Figure 4: Topological regimes in Regime H (cˆk < cˉk)
3.2. Some intuition
Fundamentally, the multiplicity of equilibria comes from the government budget con-
straint. In steady state, the fiscal rule leads to θy∗k = γ
∗d∗k, where γ
∗ = (1−g)y∗k−c∗k. Yet,
any increase in the debt ratio d∗k generates a rise in taxes to finance the additional govern-
ment debt burden, leading to an adverse effect on output (y∗k) and growth (γ
∗). It follows
that the deficit rule is consistent with two stationary solutions: a high-growth/low-debt
solution and a high-debt/low-growth solution. This explains the hump-shaped relation-
ship between the debt ratio and the consumption ratio. An increase in the debt ratio
d∗k generates first a positive effect on consumption, provided that d
∗
k < dˆk, because the
crowding-out effect of public debt on economic growth is low. On the opposite, as soon
as d∗k > dˆk, economic growth is strongly affected by the government debt interest burden,
and any further rise in d∗k reduces consumption. Consequently, due to the fiscal rule, c
∗
k
is non-monotonically associated to d∗k.
In the BBR case (θ = 0), the mechanism is similar, except that dˆk = 0 in Eq. (21),
and the d˙k = 0 curve becomes a degenerate hump-shaped curve, composed of the two
branches γ∗ = 0 and d∗k = 0, as in Figure 3. Indeed, the BBR is consistent with a positive
(constant) stock of public debt and does not preclude multiplicity, as shown in section 7.
Against this background, the mere presence of public debt with a fiscal rule explains
the multiplicity in Regimes L and H. In Regime H, there is an additional source of
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multiplicity, due to high public spending. Indeed, in the long-run, the BGP requires
K˙/K = C˙/C = γ∗. According to the Euler equation (12) and the IS equilibrium (13),
this condition amounts to (1 − g)y∗k − c∗k = (1− α)y∗k − ρ, or
c∗k − ρ = (α− g)yk(c∗k, d∗k). (22)
As we have seen, yk negatively depends on dk and ck through the labour market
equilibrium (see Eq. 16). Then, the relation between c∗k and d
∗
k crucially depends on the
sign of α−g. If g < α (regime L), an increase of c∗k decreases the RHS of (22) and rises the
LHS, thus generating an unambiguously monotonic decreasing relation between c∗k and
d∗k, as depicted in Figure 3a. If g > α (regime H), both sides of Eq. (22) positively depend
on c∗k, which produces a non-monotonic association between c
∗
k and d
∗
k. Consequently, any
debt ratio is associated with two consumption ratios, as in Figure 3b.
The role of the condition g > (<)α is intuitive. As d∗k increases, the growth rates
of consumption (C˙/C) and private capital (K˙/K) decrease, through an adverse effect
on output. However, the impact of the output ratio on the growth rate of consumption
depends on the return of capital (1 − α)—see Eq. (12), while its impact on the growth
rate of capital depends on public spending (1− g)—see Eq. (13). Therefore, if g < (>)α,
the investment-goods sector is more (less) sensitive than the consumption-goods sector to
a change of dk, and the consumption ratio ck must adjust in order to restore the equality
K˙/K = C˙/C along the BGP.
Two results deserve particular attention. First, as we will see, although the Regime
L is well-determined, the higher-growth solution (Q) cannot be reached. This explain
why governments can be induced to increase public spending until reaching Regime H.
Second, in regime H3 indeterminacy cannot be avoided, unless the positive long-run
solution disappears. Effectively, one cannot obtain the positive BGP P without the
undetermined solution Q. Thus, local and global indeterminacy can be viewed as the
price that must be paid to generate a positive long-run growth solution.
The following section presents a calibration exercise showing that the different con-
figurations arise for plausible parameters’ values.
4. A quantitative assessment
Our numerical results are based on reasonable values of parameters. In our benchmark
calibration, we choose ρ = 0.02, corresponding to the long-run value of the risk free (real)
interest rate, and the labor elasticity of substitution is fixed at ε = 0, thus characterizing
an infinite Frisch elasticity as usual in business cycle models (see SGU). Regarding the
technology, we set A = 0.05 to obtain realistic rates of economic growth, and the size of the
knowledge externality in the production function is α = 0.1, close to its value (α = 0.08)
in Turnovsky (2000). The measure of human capital intensity in the accumulation of
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knowledge is set to β = 0.75 in our baseline calibration, since human capital is probably
the most important factor in the production of knowledge.
Regarding the government’s behavior, we consider a range of deficit ratios θ ∈ (0, 0.03),
in line with long-run average values in US or OECD from 1950 to 2019. In the baseline
calibration, governments expenditure is chosen so that the fraction of net national pro-
duction devoted to public spending on goods and services equals the historical average
in the United States (g = 0.225). Besides, the sum of consumption taxes and lump-sum
taxes is assumed to be 15% of GDP (namely, μ = 0.15). For these parameters’ values,
the corresponding rate of wage taxation (in percent of GDP) is between 10% and 16.5%,
depending on the equilibrium considered (the average value in OECD data is roughly
15%).
PARAMETERS
Households
S 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ρ 0.02 Discount rate
ε 0 Labor elasticity of substitution
Technology
A 0.05 Productivity parameter
α 0.1 Size of the knowledge externality in the production function
β 0.75 Share of human capital in the production of knowledge
Government
g 0.225 Government spending on goods and services
θ 0 to 0.03 Long-run deficit-ratio target
μ 0.15 Share of consumption taxes plus lump-sum taxes in GDP
Table 1: The baseline calibration
In our benchmark calibration, regime L appears for g < 0.1, while, in the opposite
case, regime H prevails. As g ' 22.5% in historical data, we particularly focus from
now on the latter regime. Table 2 reproduces the different steady-state solutions in the
more general case (Regime H3), under a deficit target θ = 1.3% (consistent with the
existence of Regime H3). The long-run economic growth rate equals 2%, 4.7%, and 6.8%
at points M , P , and Q, respectively; and the long-run public debt to output ratio is 64%,
27%, and 19%, respectively. These numbers are fairly realistic. In particular, point M is
closely related to OECD data. This feature is of particular importance, since the cyclical
dynamics in our model appear in the neighborhood of this steady state. Moreover, the
two saddle-node bifurcations SN1 and SN2 emerge for reasonable values of the deficit
target, namely θ ' 1.46% and θ ' 1.18% respectively, and are associated to realistic
long-run economic growth and public debt ratio.
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Table 2 also computes different types of bifurcations of codimension 1 and 2 (the
codimension of a bifurcation is the number of parameters that must be varied for the
bifurcation to occur). In our benchmark calibration, a Hopf bifurcation occurs at θ '
1.42% (namely in Regime H3); while, if two parameters (here, the deficit target θ and
the public pending ratio g) are allowed to vary, a CUSP bifurcation arises at θ ' 2.3%
and g ' 22%, and a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation (labelled BT) appears at θ ' 0.7%
and g ' 23%. For lower values of the discount rate (e.g. ρ = 0.01), a Generalized Hopf
(Bautin) bifurcation (labelled GH) can also occur (at θ ' 1.8% and g ' 24% in our
calibration). The interpretation of these bifurcations will be provided in the following
sections. What is of particularly importance here is that all types of bifurcations are
consistent with economic conditions experienced by developed countries during the last
decades.
θ g γM γP γQ DM/Y M DP /Y P DQ/Y Q
SN1 0.0146 0.225 0.032 0.08 0.46 0.15
Regime H3 0.013 0.225 0.02 0.047 0.068 0.64 0.27 0.19
SN2 0.0118 0.225 0.017 0.058 0.70 0.20
CUSP 0.023 0.22 0.049 0.47
Hopf 0.0142 0.225 0.026 0.039 0.072 0.55 0.36 0.20
GH 0.018 0.24 0.025 −− −− 0.71 −− −−
BT 0.007 0.23 0.02 0.033 0.08 0.33 0.21 0.09
Table 2: Economic growth and the public debt ratio under different configurations
The three regimes established in Figure 4 appear on either parts of the two saddle-node
bifurcations (SN1 and SN2). These bifurcations can be generated by particular values
of the deficit target (θ1 and θ2, respectively). Ignoring the harrodian equilibrium D, if
θ > θ1 ' 1.46% only the high-growth solution Q exists (Regime H1); if θ < θ2 ' 1.18%
only the low-growth trap M appears (Regime H2); while in the intermediate regime
θ2 < θ < θ1, three positive-growth BGPs prevail as we have seen (Regime H3).
Interestingly, Regime H3 can occur without the need of high social returns-to-scale in
the aggregate production function. With g = 0.15, for example, regime H3 is consistent
with β = 0 and α = 0.01, namely for almost constant returns-to-scale (1+α(1+φ) = 1.01).
Indeed, for these values, regime H3 prevails as soon as 0 < θ < 1.345%. Therefore, in
our setup multiplicity (and indeterminacy) can arise even if returns to scale are close to
constant, as empirical evidence suggests (see, e.g. Basu and Fernald, 1997).19
19In contrast, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) need increasing returns in excess of 0.5. Following the
empirical works of Burnside (1996) or Basu and Fernald (1997), suggesting that the U.S. manufacturing
industry displays roughly constant returns with no external effects, a theoretical research agenda was
opened by Benhabib and Farmer (1996) in order to reduce the degree of increasing returns needed to
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram as a function of θ (regime H)
The presence of two saddle-node bifurcations in the neighborhood of the CUSP singu-
larity can generate a hysteresis phenomenon, as described in Figure 5. Suppose, e.g., that
the deficit target is θ2 < θ < θ1, and that the economy locates at the low-growth steady-
state M in Regime H3 (starting, e.g., at point H). If θ increases until θ1, the economy
moves along steady state M until point LP1. If θ increases further, the economy switches
into Regime H1 and the steady state suddenly jumps from M to Q. However, if from this
point θ is decreased, the economy does not come back to steady-state M , but public debt
decreases along steady-state Q until point LP2 at θ = θ2. If we further decrease the value
of θ, the economy switches in Regime H2, and the steady state suddenly jumps to M .
Hence, for small changes in the deficit target, the steady state warps in a non-reversible
way: decreasing too much the long-term deficit target may condemn the economy to an
irreversible steady-state with low economic growth (and high debt). Of course, such an
analysis is only based on comparative statics of the steady states, and must be further
investigated from a dynamics perspective. This is the goal of the following sections.
5. Analysis of dynamics
This section is devoted to the analysis of local dynamics, followed by global dynamics.
generate indeterminacy. The conclusion was that indeterminacy can arise with low increasing returns, or
even constant returns, in multi-sector models (see, e.g., Benhabib and Nishimura, 1998; Benhabib et al.,
2000); for example, indeterminacy requires increasing returns of about 0.07 in Benhabib and Farmer
(1996). In our one-sector model, indeterminacy can arise with very low increasing returns around 0.01.
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5.1. Local dynamics
By linearization, in the neighborhood of steady-state i, i ∈ S = {D,M,P,Q}, the
system (15) behaves according to (c˙k, d˙k) = J
i(ck − cik, dk − dik), where Ji is the Jacobian
matrix. The reduced-form includes one jump variable (the consumption ratio ck0) and one
pre-determined variable (the public-debt ratio dk0, since the initial stocks of public debt
D0 and private capital K0 are predetermined). Hence, for BGP i to be well determined,
the Jacobian matrix
Ji =
(
CC i CDi
DC i DDi
)
,
must contain two opposite-sign eigenvalues, where, using (15),
CC i = cik[1 + (g − α)yci], (23)
CDi = cik(g − α)ydi, (24)
DDi = θydi − γi − (1− g)ydidik, (25)
DC i = θyci − (1− g)ycidik + dik, (26)
with, using (16),
yci :=
∂yik
∂cik
= −ψy
i
k
cik
< 0, and ydi :=
∂yik
∂dik
= − (1− α)ψy
i
k
dˉ− (1− α)dik
< 0. (27)
Hence, the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix are, respectively
Tr(Ji) = θydi + cik[1 + (g − α)yci]− γi − (1− g)ydidik, (28)
det(Ji) = −cik[γi − θydi + (1− g)dikydi + (g − α)(γiyci + dikydi)]. (29)
The following theorem establishes the topological behaviour of each steady state.
Theorem 2. (Local Stability)
• In regime L, M is locally unstable and P is locally determinate (saddle-point stable).
• In regime H, points D and P are locally determinate (saddle-point stable); point Q
is locally indeterminate (stable); and M can be either locally indeterminate (stable)
or unstable.
Corollary 1. A Hopf bifurcation can emerge in the neighborhood of M(cMk , d
M
k ), if its
coordinates verify dMk < dˆk. In particular, for small values of θ, the Hopf bifurcation is
reached at θh such that
θh := (1− g)dMk −
CCM
ydM
. (30)
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The major difference between regimes L and H is related to the monotonicity of the
c˙k = 0 curve. As we have seen (see Theorem 1), the two regimes are characterized by
the saddle-node bifurcation SN1, at which points M and P collide. But, in regime H,
another bifurcation SN2 arises, which gives birth, for nearby parameters’ values, to the
positive-growth solutions P and Q. Thus, the interplay between the consumption ratio
and the public debt ratio can give rise to complex dynamics, depending on the location
of steady states in the plane (dk, ck).
The local stability analysis points out that, due to the possibility of a Hopf bifurcation,
small changes in the deficit target can generate radical shifts in the dynamics, together
with large oscillations of economic growth and public debt in the neighborhood of the
low-growth trap M . Sections 6 and 7 explicitly characterize this bifurcation. Beforehand,
we turn to global dynamics.
5.2. Global dynamics and (in)determinacy
According to the analysis of local dynamics, we can distinguish four cases depending
on the fiscal policy parameters—the deficit target and the public spending ratio.
Regime L – There are two steady states, but only the higher BGP (P ) can be reached
in the long-run, as the low-growth trap (M) is unstable. Hence, there is no local or global
indeterminacy in this regime (Figure 6a).20
Regime H1 – This regime is also characterized by two steady states. One is as-
sociated to high economic growth (Q, with low consumption and deficit ratios) and is
stable, while the harrodian equilibrium D is saddle-path stable. Consequently, there is
local indeterminacy in the vicinity of Q, and possibly global indeterminacy, because the
economy can move towards Q or D, if the initial debt ratio is such that dk0 > dˆk (see
Figure 6b).
Regime H2 – In this regime there are equally two steady states, M and D. The
latter is still locally determinate, but the topological behavior of the low-growth trap M
depends on its position relative to dk. If d
M
k > dˆk, M is unstable, and there is no local or
global indeterminacy. Starting from an initial public debt ratio close to dMk , the economy
converges towards the harrodian equilibrium D. In contrast, if dMk < dˆk, there is global
indeterminacy, as states the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If dMk < dˆk, the steady state exhibits indeterminacy as follows: for initial
public debt ratios originating in the neighborhood of M , the economy can converge to the
point D, to the point M , or can join a periodic orbit around point M , depending on the
initial jump in consumption.
20The initial public debt ratio exerts a threshold effect: if dk0 < dMk , for any predetermined dk0 the
consumption ratio ck0 jumps to place the economy on the saddle-path that converges towards P , which
defines the unique long-run equilibrium. In contrast, if dk0 > dMk there is no long-run solution.
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Proof. If dMk < dˆk there is a Hopf bifurcation at CC
M = −DDM ⇔ θ = θh, as we
have seen. This Hopf bifurcation can be supercritical, generating a stable limit cycle (if
the first Lyapunov coefficient is negative), or subcritical, generating an unstable closed
orbit (if the first Lyapunov coefficient is positive), depending on parameters. Indeed,
a Generalized (Bautin) Hopf bifurcation may arise for realistic values of parameters, as
stated in Table 2. At this Generalized Hopf bifurcation the first Lyapunov coefficient is
zero, ensuring the presence of stable limit cycles for nearby parameter values. Hence, the
economy can converge towards a periodic orbit around M if the bifurcation is supercritical
or directly jump on this orbit if the bifurcation is subcritical as in Figure 6c. In addition,
if dk0 > dˆk, there is a unique trajectory that goes towards the harrodian equilibrium D.
As a consequence, given a predetermined debt ratio any path that converges toward M
or D, or joins the cycle, can be reached. ¤
Figure 6: Global dynamics
Regime H3 – There are four steady states: P and D are still saddle-path stable, Q
is still stable, but the local stability of point M depends on its location relative to dˆk, as
in Regime H2. The following proposition summarizes the global dynamics.
Proposition 2. In regime H3, the dynamics exhibit indeterminacy as follows:
i. Trajectories originating in the neighborhood of M can converge either to points D,
P , or Q. Points D and P can be reached by only one trajectory, while there is an
infinite set of trajectories converging to Q.
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ii. Additionally, if dMk < dˆk, the economy can join M or a periodic orbit around M .
Proof. The proof of (i) directly results from Theorem 1. If dMk > dˆk, point M is unstable,
and the economy can converge towards saddle-points D or P , or the (locally indeter-
minate) steady state Q. If dMk < dˆk, a Hopf bifurcation arises at θ = θ
h, as stated in
Corollary 1. As previously, this bifurcation can be subcritical or supercritical, depending
on parameters. Thus, point M can be stable, associated to an instable periodic orbit, or
unstable with a stable limit cycle around M ; hence (ii). ¤
Regime H is thus characterized by local (in the vicinity of Q and M , and of the pos-
sible limit-cycle that surrounds the low-growth trap M), and global indeterminacy. The
short-run and long-run behavior of the economy is then subject to “animal spirits”, in
the form of self-fulfilling prophecies that generate multiple balanced growth paths in the
future. Such indeterminacy is intuitive. Suppose, for example, that at the initial time
households expect low public debt in the steady-state. This implies that the expected
tax rate is low, and the expected net return of capital is high. Then, at the initial time
households increase their savings, such that the initial consumption ratio (ck0) is low
and the initial hours worked will be high. In equilibrium, labor supply will also be high,
generating large fiscal resources and low public debt in the future (along P and Q BGPs).
Conversely, following the same mechanism, high expected public debt is self-fulfilling, and
may lead to the growth solutions M or D. In other words, by their consumption-leisure
tradeoff at the initial time, forward-looking households can, in equilibrium, validate any
expectation on the BGP that can be reached in the future.
Figure 7 synthesizes our results in the (θ, g) plane. The two saddle-node bifurcations
are depicted by the curves SN1(θ) and SN2(θ) that represent the limit-points between
regimes H1 and H3, and H3 and H2, respectively. For our benchmark calibration g =
0.225, and these limit-points are labelled LP1 and LP2, respectively. The CUSP point
(labelled CP ) occurs at the intersection of these two bifurcation curves, such that, for
higher values of the deficit target or lower values of the public spending ratio, Regime
H3 vanishes. The dashed curve H(θ) depicts the locus of Hopf bifurcations. For the
benchmark calibration, the Hopf bifurcation point (labelled H) is located in Regime H3,
but it can be located in Regime H2 for lower values of the public spending ratio, as shows
Figure 7.
It must be emphasized that the area consistent with Regime H3 enlarges as the deficit
target is reduced. Therefore, ceteris paribus, a small deficit target is likely to increase the
risk of aggregate fluctuations. Yet, as shows section 7, local and global indeterminacy do
not vanish under a BBR.
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Figure 7: Location of regimes and bifurcation points in the (θ, g) plane
6. Long-run endogenous public debt cycles
According to Corollary 1 and Proposition 2, our model produces a (local) Hopf bi-
furcation in the neighborhood of the low-growth trap M in Regime H3. Moreover, the
occurrence of a (global) Generalized Hopf bifurcation ensures that this local bifurcation
can be supercritical, hence ensuring the presence of stable limit-cycles for nearby param-
eters’ values. In this section we characterize these limit-cycles, and show that they get
larger as the deficit target is reduced. At the limit, when steady states M and P are
close, the limit-cycle that surrounds M merges with the stable and unstable saddle-paths
of P , through a saddle-loop bifurcation generating an homoclinic orbit. The existence of
such a homoclinic orbit follows from the occurrence of a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation.
In a two (or more) parameter system, such a bifurcation occurs when a Hopf bifurcation,
a saddle-loop bifurcation, and a saddle-node bifurcation coincide in a single point of the
parameter space.
At first, we compute the family of limit-cycles that emerge when the deficit target θ
is reduced in the vicinity of the Hopf bifurcation. As we have seen, in the benchmark
calibration the Hopf bifurcation occurs at θh ' 1.418%, and (as the bifurcation is super-
critical in the benchmark calibration) stable limit-cycles born for slightly lower values.
As the deficit target becomes more stringent, these limit cycles enlarge and generate large
fluctuations in public debt and economic growth (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Public debt and growth cycles as a function of θ
Figures 9 describes the dynamics in the neighborhood of points M and P , depending
on the deficit target. If θ > θh, the low-growth trap is locally sable (Figure 9a). At θ = θh
the Hopf bifurcation occurs, and stable limit-cycles arise for θ˜ < θ < θh (Figure 9b). The
existence of stable limit cycles for a range of parameters such that θ˜ < θ < θh implies
that a small perturbation to a parameter would not eliminate the cyclical dynamics of
public debt and growth. The limit-cycle enlarge as θ decreases, until it coincides with the
stable and unstable manifolds of the saddle point P , at θ = θ˜ ' 1.3885%. At this point,
there is a saddle-loop bifurcation, which is depicted in Figure 9c. At the bifurcation, the
periodic orbit connects P to himself, producing a homoclinic orbit (i.e. the limit cycle
degenerates into an orbit homoclinic to the saddle). For lower values of θ, as in Figure
9d, periodic orbits no longer exist and the anti-saddle path of P now escapes point P
and moves eventually to points Q or D.
9a: M is stable (θh < θ)
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9b: Stable limit cycle around M (θ˜ < θ < θh)
9c: Saddle-loop bifurcation (θ = θ˜)
9d: Limit-cycles vanish (θ < θ˜)
Figure 9: A typology of global dynamics in the neighborhood of the low-growth trap
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To prove the existence of the homoclinic orbit, we shall refer to the Bogdanov-Takens
(BT) bifurcation. This co-dimension two bifurcation occurs in a dynamic two-parameter
system when a critical point has a zero eigenvalue of multiplicity two. The following
proposition shows that a generic BT bifurcation arises in our model, when steady states
M and P collide at a point such that dMk = d
P
k < dˆk.
Proposition 3. Define the BT singularity as a steady state with two zero eigenvalues
but a nonzero Jacobian matrix. There is a critical pair of fiscal instruments (gbt, θbt) that
satisfies this singularity.
Proof. We prove Proposition 3 for small economic growth (γ → 0), as it is the case in
the neighborhood of the low-growth trap M (see Appendix B). There is a pair (gbt, θbt),
such that (det(JM ), Tr(JM)) = (0, 0), where
gbt =
α + μ− A
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)(1+ψ)/ψ
1− A
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)(1+ψ)/ψ ,
θbt =
(1 + αψ − gbt(1 + ψ))(α + μ− gbt)
ψ(gbt − α) .
¤
The Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation is obtained at point BT in Table 2, at (gbt, θbt) '
(0.23, 0.007). At this point, as Figure 7 shows, the saddle-node curve SN1(θ) is tangent
with the Hopf-curve H(θ). The mechanism driving the homoclinic orbits is as follows.
The point where P and M collide defines the saddle-node bifurcation SN1, while (if
cˆk < cˉk and d
M
k < dˆk) M undergoes a Hopf bifurcation generating a periodic orbit in
Regime H3, as we have seen. The BT bifurcation is then obtained as the collision of the
saddle-node and the Hopf bifurcations. As (g, θ) gets closer to (gbt, θbt), the non-saddle
point M converges towards P , so that the periodic orbit collides with the manifolds of
the saddle equilibrium and degenerates into a homoclinic orbit.
The presence of a BT bifurcation has important implications. Indeed, for parame-
ter values close to (gbt, θbt), the economy can experiment large fluctuations in economic
growth and public debt, or slowly converge towards the steady state P along the ho-
moclinic orbit (a cycle with virtually infinite period). For nearby parameter values, the
economy escapes point P and converges towards the stable steady state Q.
Figure 10 exemplifies a spectacular aspect of the perils of fiscal rules: a very small
change in the target may produce radical shifts in long-run dynamics. If, e.g., θ passes
from 1.3888% to 1.3889%, the paths of economic growth and public debt are similar
until t = 3000, but their dynamics suddenly change after this time. In the first case,
the economy gradually converges towards Q, while in the second case it is character-
ized by periodic recessions with sharp increases in public debt, or by a homoclinic loop
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that reaches the saddle steady state P (this saddle-loop bifurcation defines the border-
line between the trajectories that converge to Q and those that join P ). Beyond this
extreme sensitivity to changes in parameters, the asymmetric cyclical dynamics that our
model produces—with long periods of nearby-stationary growth and sudden short-living
recessions—are consistent with observed stylized facts.
Figure 10: Path-dependance to small changes in the deficit target
The fact that a public deficit target gives birth to large fluctuations and possible
local and global indeterminacy might plead in favor of the adoption of balanced-budget
rules. However, in our model, the tighter the deficit target, the larger oscillations of
public debt and economic growth, and the higher the area of indeterminacy, as we have
seen. Furthermore, as shown in the following section, the BBR is also likely to produce
indeterminacy and large fluctuations.
7. The BBR special case
In this section, we study the case θ = 0, ∀t, which characterizes the balanced-budget
rule (BBR) associated with no deficit (but possibly positive inherited public debt, i.e.
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dk0 ≥ 0). In this case, Eq. (18) leads to
γ(c∗k, d
∗
k)d
∗
k = 0,
where economic growth is γ∗ := (1− g)yk(c∗k, d∗k)− c∗k. Disregarding negative public debt,
this condition implies that either γ = 0 and dk > 0, or γ > 0 and dk = 0.
Compared with the previous section, the d˙k = 0 locus now becomes a degenerate
hump-shaped curve which peaks at (0, cˉk), as depicted by the dashed lines in Figure 3.
The first part of this curve corresponds to the dk = 0 locus associated to non-zero growth;
and the second part corresponds to γ(ck, dk) = 0, describing a decreasing relation between
dk and ck. This means that the maximum of d˙k = 0 is now located at dˆk = 0.
Regime L is qualitatively unchanged, except that point M now qualifies a zero-growth
trap (see Appendix C for the analytical proof). In Regime H, under the BBR the
parameter sets that give rise to the saddle-node bifurcations can be found analytically,
as establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If θ = 0 and g > α, there are two saddle-node bifurcations at ρ1 and ρ2
(with 0 < ρ1 < ρ2), where
ρ1 := (1 + ψ)
[
dˉ[(g − α)A]1/ψ
ψ
]ψ/(1+ψ)
,
ρ2 := (g − α)A
(
dˉ
cˉk
)ψ
+ cˉk.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The critical values ρ1 and ρ2 correspond respectively to points (0, cˉk) (bifurcation
point SN1) and to (0, cˆk) (bifurcation point SN2) in Figure 11, such that regime H can
be subdivided between three cases. If ρ > ρ2 (Regime H1), there is one positive growth
solution (corresponding to point Q in the previous sections), and one negative-growth
solution. If ρ < ρ1 (Regime H2), there is one no-growth solution (corresponding to point
M in the previous sections). If ρ1 < ρ < ρ2 (Regime H3), there are two positive-growth
solutions (points P and Q) and the no-growth solution (point M) if cˉk > cˆk (Figure 11a).
If cˉk < cˆk, the two positive-growth solutions turn into negative-growth solutions (Figure
11b). Hence, with a BBR, Regime H3 can appear in the case cˉk < cˆk, in contrast with
the preceding sections, but points P and Q are now associated to negative-growth BGPs.
Even if these solutions are not economically attractive, they play an important role in
the dynamics around point M , as we will see. In all configurations, there is also the
degenerate solution (D). According to our calibration exercise, ρ1 and ρ2 take reasonable
values, namely ρ1 = 0.0213 and ρ2 = 0.0378.
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-a- cˉk > cˆk -b- cˉk < cˆk
Figure 11: Topological behaviour of Regime H (θ = 0)
The following proposition states the topological properties of the different equilibria.
Proposition 4.
i. If cMk > cˆk, P is locally determinate (saddle-path stable), Q is locally indeterminate,
and the no-growth trap M is unstable.
ii. If cMk < cˆk, the no-growth trap M can become stable, with the presence of a Hopf
bifurcation, and, since economic growth is negative, Q is determinate and P becomes
indeterminate.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Under the BBR, our model is similar to SGU, but in an endogenous growth context. 21
In a neoclassical exogenous growth model, SGU show that aggregate instability (defined
as the local indeterminacy of the unique perfect-foresight steady-state) occurs when taxes
are levied on labor income, irrespective of the level of public spending. In our endogenous
growth setup, their analysis needs to be amended on two grounds. First, in the case with
low public spending (g < α, Regime L), the perfect-foresight BGP is unique and well-
determined, such that there is no aggregate instability, as in section 3. Second, in the
case with high public spending (g > α, Regime H), there are multiple steady states, of
which one is locally indeterminate. Hence, in this regime, our aggregate-instability result
covers a broader class of mechanisms than in SGU, because it relies both on local and
global indeterminacy. Furthermore, cyclical dynamics can appear around the no-growth
trap, in the vicinity of the Hopf bifurcation.
21Contrary to SGU who consider a BBR with no debt (Dt = 0, ∀t), our BBR can be associated to a
(strictly) positive public debt level. Indeed, for an economy starting with an initial public debt D0 > 0,
the BBR implies that public debt is constant over time: D˙t = 0 ⇔ Dt = D0, ∀t. This is an important
point, because we exhibit complex dynamics of the public debt ratio (dkt = D0/Kt > 0) even if the
public debt level is constant.
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Under the BBR, the Hopf-bifurcation parameter can no longer be the deficit target
(as θ = 0), and another bifurcation parameter must be found. The following proposition
establishes the existence of a Hopf bifurcation as a function of the public spending ratio.
Proposition 5. In the BBR case, a Hopf bifurcation occurs if cMk < cˆk at the unique
value gh, such that
gh =
A0(1− (1− α)ψ) + ψ(α + μ)
A0 + ψ
,
where A0 := A(ρ/(1− α)A)(1+ψ)/ψ.
Proof: The proof directly results from corollary 1. By Eq. (30), if θ = 0 the Hopf
bifurcation is such that
(1− gh)dMk =
CCM
ydM
. (31)
As ydM < 0, Eq. (31) can be verified only if CCM < 0, namely if cMk < cˆk. Indeed, in the
BBR case, the Hopf bifurcation cannot arise if cMk > cˆk, because dˆk = 0 ⇒ DDM > 0,
∀dk ≥ 0. Since DDM > 0, a necessary condition for Tr(JM) to change sign is CCM < 0.
From Appendix B, we have
CCM =
ρ(1 + ψ)
1− α (g
m − g), where gm := 1 + αψ
1 + ψ
> α,
hence the public spending ratio must be higher than gm.22 By inspection of (23) and
(27) follows Proposition 3. ¤
The case cMk < cˆk occurs when human capital externalities are high enough (in our
calibration exercise below, we consider β = 0.885 with otherwise the baseline calibration).
The public spending ratio that corresponds to the Hopf bifurcation is gh = 0.2345 (the
associated Lyapunov coefficient is equal to 587, defining a sub-critical Hopf bifurcation).
For all reasonable configurations of parameters, no Generalized Hopf bifurcation has been
found, excluding the existence of stable limit-cycles under the BBR. Therefore, there is
a periodic orbit around the no-growth trap M that can be reached by a jump in the
consumption ratio. As the cycle is unstable, inside the orbit all trajectories converge
to the low-growth trap M , while outside the orbit the economy eventually goes to the
catastrophic equilibrium D (if we exclude the negative-growth steady state Q). This
generates both local (in the vicinity of M) and global indeterminacy: since the initial
consumption ratio is a free jumpable variable, starting with a predetermined public debt
ratio dk0 < dˉ/(1 − α), the economy can converge towards the no-growth trap M , the
catastrophic equilibrium D, or a periodic orbit around M , depending on households’
views on the future.
22To ensure that gh ≥ gm, we assume that α(1 + ψA0) ≤ μ(1 + ψ).
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12a: The family of periodic orbits as g increases
12b: Behavior of the debt ratio and economic growth for g = 0.2348
Figure 12: Dynamics under the BBR
The magnitude of the periodic orbit that encloses point M enlarges as g increases. The
economy then fluctuates between the harrodian BGP (D) and the negative-growth steady
state Q, as in Figure 12a. The largest orbit (obtained for gˉ ' 0.2349) is the heteroclinic
connection between D and Q (Q is saddle-point stable with negative growth), defining
the envelope of an elliptic sector, which contains an infinite number of stable orbits that
converge to point M . Inside the periodic orbit, self-fulfilling prophecies can generate a
great variety of transitory endogenous cycles along which the economy experiments large
fluctuations before being trapped in secular stagnation. For a high public spending ratio,
i.e. close to gˉ, the periodic orbit passes “near” points D and Q, such that the economy
is subject to sudden “heart attacks” of public debt (see Figure 12b), as emphasized by
Rogoff (2015).
Compared with the the main analysis with a positive deficit rule, under the BBR
the economy is equally subject to large oscillations in public debt and economic growth.
However, two major differences emerge. First, the closed orbit that turns around point M
is unstable and contains all stable trajectories that converge towards M . Consequently,
the cycle can be reached only by an adequate jump in the initial consumption ratio,
following households’ expectations. Do households expect that the steady state is M
(or D), the economy leaves the cyclical orbit to jump on a path that joins this point.
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This “knife-edge” property of expectations was avoided in the preceding section, because
the limit-cycle was stable.23 Second, in the vicinity of the heteroclinic orbit, stationary
growth is negative at point Q, while it was positive previously at point P in the vicinity of
the saddle-loop bifurcation. Then, beyond large public debt fluctuations, the dynamics of
economic growth radically differ. With a positive deficit target, the economy experiences
long periods of positive growth, interrupted by brief slowdown episodes (see Figure 10).
In contrast, the BBR leads the economy into a secular recession, interspersed with periods
of exuberant growth as in Figure 12b.
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper we developed an original framework for assessing the role of fiscal rules
for aggregate fluctuations. Our model illustrates the perils of fiscal rules. First, fiscal
rules are destabilizing because multiple equilibria and complex dynamics can emerge even
when the deficit target is low (including the balanced-budget rule). Second, the economy
can experiment (possibly large) public debt and growth fluctuations both in the short
and the long run without the need of exogenous shocks. Indeed, the interaction between
households’ optimal saving behaviour and the government’s budget constraint gives birth
to Hopf and Bogdanov-Takens bifurcations that ensure the stability of public debt cycles.
The calibration of the model—consistent with OECD or US data—reveals the realism of
our findings: the various bifurcations occur for reasonable values of parameters, and the
cycles that our model are consistent with observed stylized facts.
Finally, our model opens the door for a limit-cycles-based theory of public debt fluc-
tuations. From a methodological perspective, a fruitful extension would be to examine a
stochastic version of our model, as in Beaudry et al. (2016). From a policy perspective,
another extension could analyze the consequences of fiscal policy in terms of aggregate
fluctuations. On the one hand, some of the conclusions of the existing literature may have
to be revisited in the presence of deficit and debt. Reassessing the role of progressive
taxes, endogenous public spending, or alternative specifications of preferences as drivers
of indeterminacy are some handful examples. On the other hand, the complex effects
triggered by our simple deficit rule make the case for exploring alternative fiscal rules,
all the more given their increased popularity since the recent crisis (Combes et al., 2017;
Menuet et al., 2018). These possible directions are left for future research.
23Therefore, if θ > 0 cycles are not associated to a particular expectation, but are consistent with
an infinity of expectations. There is no knife-edge, and the cycles emerge even if consumption was a
backward variable. Importantly, the jump of consumption depends on the the tax rate, therefore on
wages: if the adjustment of wages cannot take place—for example, if there is a resistance to increases in
wage taxes—then consumption is no longer a jump variable (or the adjustment will be sluggish).
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
We study the local stability of steady-states by inspecting the slope of c˙k = 0 (denoted
by sic) and d˙k = 0 (denoted by s
i
d) in the neighbourhood of each BGP i.
First, using the Implicit Function Theorem, we compute sic = −CDi/CC i and sid =
−DDi/DC i.
Second, the trace and the determinant of the jacobian matrix are Tr(Ji) = CC i+DDi
and det(Ji) = CC iDDi − CDiDC i = CC iDC i(sic − sid).
Third, from Eq. (23)-(26), as θ is small enough, we have (i) DC i > 0; (ii) CC i > 0 in
regime L; (iii) CDi > 0 in regime L and CDi < 0 in regime H.
Hence, we deduce the following results.
• In regime L, we have sMd < 0, with |sMd | > |sMc |, as shown in Figure 3a. Thus,
it follows that DDM > 0, i.e. det(JM ) > 0, and Tr(JM) > 0, hence point M is
unstable. Regarding point P , there are two possible cases:
(a) DDP < 0 (as illustrated in Figure 3a). In this case, det(JP ) < 0, i.e. P is a
saddle point.
(b) DDP > 0. In this case, we have sPd < 0, with |sPd | < |sPc |, thus: det(JP ) < 0,
and P is still saddle.
• In regime H, we can divide the (ck, dk)-plan in four distinct areas, as depicted in
Figure A1:
- north-east (NE): sic > 0, and s
i
d < 0 ⇒ det(Ji) > 0, and Tr(Ji) > 0.
- south-east (SE): sic < 0, s
i
d < 0, and |sid| > |sic| ⇒ CC i < 0, and det(Ji) < 0.
- south-west (SW ): sic < 0 and s
i
d > 0 ⇒ det(Ji) > 0 and Tr(Ji) < 0.
- north-west (NW ): sic > 0, s
i
d > 0, and there are two configurations: (i) if |sid| > |sic|
⇒ CC i > 0, and det(Ji) < 0; (ii) if |sid| < |sic| ⇒ det(Ji) > 0 and Tr(Ji) can be
positive or negative.
As D ∈ SE, D is saddle-path stable. If P and Q exist, as P ∈ NW with |sPd | > |sPc |
and Q ∈ SW , it follows that P is saddle-path stable and Q is locally indeterminate
(stable). Regarding point M , two situations can arise: if M ∈ NE, M is unstable,
while if M ∈ NW with |sMd | < |sMc |, a Hopf bifurcation can occur when CCM +
DDM = 0. Corollary 1 comes directly from Eqs. (23) and (25).
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Figure A1: Local stability (cˆk < cˉk)
Appendix B. Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation and homoclinic orbits
We prove the occurrence of a Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcation and homoclinic or-
bits in the neighborhood of equilibrium M (formally, γ → 0) using a two-step proof. In
the first step, we will show that there is a critical pair of fiscal instruments that character-
izes the BT singularity. In the second step, we demonstrate the existence of a homoclinic
orbit around point M , using the argument that points P and M collide at the BT bifur-
cation.
Step 1: Preliminary.
First of all, we compute the coordinates of point M when γM → 0. By Eq. (12),
when γM → 0, it follows that yMk = ρ/(1 − α). From Theorem 1, we deduce that cMk =
(1 − g)ρ/(1 − α), and dMk = 1(1−α)
{
dˉ− cMk
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)1/ψ}
. From Eq. (27), we compute:
ycM = −ψ/(1− g), ydM = − (1−α)ψ
(1−g)(ρ/(1−α)A)1/ψ .
Second, when γM → 0, we obtain, using Eqs. (28) and (29)
Tr(JM ) = θydM + cMk [1 + (g − α)ycM ]− (1− g)ydMdMk , (B.1)
det(JM ) = −cMk ydM [(1− α)dMk − θ]. (B.2)
We need to find the values of parameters g and θ, such that Tr(JM) = det(JM) = 0.
On the one hand, using (B.2), it follows that det(JM) = 0 ⇔ dˉ−(1−g)A
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)1+1/ψ
=
θ. As dˉ = α + μ + θ − g, we conclude that det(JM ) = 0 ⇔ g = gbt, where
gbt :=
α + μ− A
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)1+1/ψ
1− A
(
ρ
(1−α)A
)1+1/ψ .
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On the other hand, at g = gbt, we have, using (B.1), Tr(JM ) = 0 ⇔ θ = θbt, where
θbt :=
(1 + αψ − gbt(1 + ψ))(α + μ− gbt)
ψ(gbt − α) .
As ρ is small enough, we ensure that gbt > 0 and θbt > 0 under the mild condition
1− α > μ(1 + ψ) (in our baseline calibration, we find gbt ≈ 0.23 and θbt ≈ 0.007). Con-
sequently, at (g, θ) = (gbt, θbt), it follows that Tr(JM ) = (JM ) = 0; hence, the Jacobian
matrix JM has a double zero eigenvalue.
Step 2: Homoclinic orbit.
We prove the occurrence of the BT bifurcation by applying a theorem that allows us to
transform our system into a simpler, topologically equivalent planar system of differen-
tial equations with well-known bifurcation diagram. We conclude using a Lemma that
ensures the occurrence of homoclinic orbits.
Theorem (Kuznetsov, 1998, Theorem 8.4, p. 321) Suppose that a planar system
x˙ = f(x, α), x ∈ R2, α ∈ R2,
with smooth f , has at α = 0, the equilibrium x = 0 with a double zero eigenvalue:
λ1,2 = 0.
Assume the following generic conditions are satisfied:
(BT.0) the jacobian matrix A(0) = fx(0, 0) 6= 0;
(BT.1) a20(0) + b11(0) 6= 0;
(BT.2) b20(0) 6= 0;
(BT.3) the map
(x, α) 7→
(
f(x, α), tr
(
∂f(x, α)
∂x
)
, det
(
∂f(x, α)
∂x
))
is regular at point (x, α) = (0, 0).
Then there exist smooth invertible variable transformations smoothly depending on
the parameters, a direction-preserving time reparametrization, and smooth invertible
parameter changes, which together reduce the system to{
η˙1 = η2,
η˙2 = β1 + β2η1 + η
2
1 + sη1η2 + O(||η||3),
where s := sgn[b20(a20(0) + b11(0))] = ±1. ¤
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Let α := (g−gbt, θ−θbt) and x := (ck−cMk , dk−dMk ). Clearly, at α = 0, the equilibrium
x = 0 has a double zero eigenvalue. We need to ensure conditions (BT.0)-(BT.3).
Condition (BT.0). Using Eq. (23), at point M , we have
CCM = cMk [1 + (g − α)ycM ] =
ρ
1− α (1 + ψα− g(1 + ψ)),
hence; CCM |g=gbt = ρ1−α
(
1 + ψα− gbt(1 + ψ)) 6= 0. Consequently, the jacobian matrix
JM evaluated at (g, θ) = (gbt, θbt) is non-zero.
Conditions (BT.1) and (BT.2). Numerically, we compute the generic BT parameters,
and show that a20(0) + b11(0) 6= 0 and b20(0) 6= 0 for a large constellation of parameters.
Using our baseline calibration, we find a20 = −0.0232 and b11 = 4.88.
Conditions (BT.3). Let φ : (x, α) 7→ (f(x, α), Tr(JM), det(JM )). Numerically, we
ensure that det(φ(0, 0)) 6= 0 for a large space of parameters.
Finally, according to the above-mentioned theorem, our system is topological equiva-
lent to the following two-differential-equations system in the neighborhood of equilibrium
M {
η˙1 = η2,
η˙2 = β1 + β2η1 + η
2
1 ± η1η2,
(B.3)
where β1 and β2 are combinations of parameters. The coefficient on η1η2 is −1, since
the periodic orbit around point M is stable (the first Lyapunov coefficient is negative
in our baseline calibration). Thus, the bifurcation diagram is usually depicted in the
(β1, β2)-plane (Kuznetsov, 1998, section 8.4.2), where the origin corresponds to the BT
bifurcation.
Against this background, the existence of homoclinic orbits directly derives from the
properties of the bifurcation diagram and the following lemma.
Lemma (Kuznetsov, 1998, Lemma 8.7) There is a unique smooth curve P corre-
sponding to a saddle homoclinic bifurcation in system (B.3) that originates at β = 0 and
has the following local representation
P =
{
(β1, β2) : β1 = − 6
25
β22 + o(β
2
2), β2 < 0
}
.
¤
Consequently, in the neighborhood of equilibrium M , this lemma establishes that
there is a combination of parameters such that there exists at least one bifurcation curve
originating at β = 0 (i.e. (g, θ) = (gbt, θbt)), along which system (B.3) has a saddle
homoclinic bifurcation. To sum up, if (ck, dk) is close to (c
M
k , d
M
k ), and (g, θ) is close to
the BT bifurcation (gbt, θbt) the economy can experiment an homoclinic orbit (along the
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curve P).
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Using the Keynes-Ramsey relationship (17) with θ = 0, positive growth solutions are
given by the implicit function Φ(ck) = 0, where
Φ(ck) := dˉ− ck
(
ck − ρ
(α− g)A
)1/ψ
. (C.1)
(a) Case g < α. Clearly, Φ ∈ C1((ρ, +∞)) and Φ is a decreasing function, hence a
decreasing relationship between ck and dk, as depicted in Figure 3a. As Φ(ρ) = dˉ > 0,
and limck→+∞ Φ(ck) = −∞, according to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a
unique point cˇk ∈ (ρ, +∞), such that Φ(cˇk) = 0. The point P = (0, cˇk) characterizes a
steady-state if and only if cPk < ck = [A(1−g)dˉψ]1/(1+ψ), which is true for a small discount
rate.24
(b) Case g > α. In this case, Φ ∈ C1([0, ρ)), and
Φ′(ck) =
[
ρ− ck
(g − α)A
]−1+1/ψ [
1 + ψ
ψ(g − α)A
]
(ck − cˆk),
where cˆk = ψρ/(1 + ψ) < ρ is the minimum of Φ on [0, ρ), as depicted in Figure 3b.
Consequently, Φ′(ck) < 0 if ck ∈ [0, cˆk) and Φ′(ck) > 0 if ck ∈ (cˆk, ρ). As Φ(0) =
Φ(ρ) = dˉ > 0, according to the Intermediate Value Theorem, there are two roots: cQk ∈
(0, cˆk) and c
P
k ∈ (cˆk, ρ) if and only if
Φ(cˆk) = dˉ− cˆk
(
ρ− cˆk
(g − α)A
)1/ψ
< 0. (C.2)
As shown by the following lemma, the existence conditions can be expressed according
to the value of ρ.
Lemma 1. Let g > α. There are two critical levels ρ1 and ρ2 (0 < ρ1 < ρ2) such that:
• If ρ < ρ1, Φ(∙) has no root.
• If ρ1 < ρ < ρ2, Φ(∙) has two roots, and cPk < ck.
• If ρ > ρ2, Φ(∙) has two roots, and cPk > ck.
Proof. First, from (C.2), we have Φ(cˆk) ≥ 0 ⇔ ρ ≤ ρ1 := (1 + ψ)
[
dˉ[(g−α)A]1/ψ
ψ
]ψ/(1+ψ)
. As
Figure 11 depicts, the value ρ1 is such that the two positive growth solutions (P and Q)
24Indeed, if ρ → 0, using Eq. (C.1) we have cPk ≈ [A(α− g)dˉψ]1/(1+ψ) < [A(1− g)dˉψ]1/(1+ψ) = ck.
40
coincide (cPk = c
Q
k = cˆk). For ρ > ρ1, there are two roots (regime H3), while for ρ < ρ1,
there is no root (regimes H1 or H2).
Second, from (C.1), we compute Φ(cˉk) ≥ 0 ⇔ ρ ≤ ρ2 := (g − α)A
(
dˉ
cˉk
)ψ
+ cˉk; hence
if ρ ≤ ρ2 ⇔ cˉk ≤ cQk < cˆk or cˉk ≥ cPk > cˆk. There are two cases.
(i) cˉk > cˆk: in this case, we have ρ ≤ ρ2 ⇔ cPk ≤ cˉk. As Figure 11a shows, ρ2 is
such that the higher positive growth solution (P ) and the no growth solution coincide
(cPk = c
M
k = ck).
(ii) cˉk < cˆk: in this case, we have ρ ≤ ρ2 ⇔ cQk ≥ cˉk. As Figure 11b shows, ρ2 is
such that the lower positive growth solution (Q) and the no growth solution coincide
(cQk = c
M
k = ck).
Finally, we ensure that ρ1 < ρ2 for a large constellation of parameters. Using our
baseline calibration (Table 2), we find ρ1 = 0.0213 and ρ2 = 0.0378. ¤
Consequently, we sum up the two different cases.
(i) cˉk > cˆk. If ρ > ρ2 > ρ1, solutions P and Q are present, but there is only one
positive-growth steady-state: Q (regime H1). If ρ1 < ρ < ρ2, P and Q characterize
positive-growth solutions (regime H3). Finally, if ρ < ρ1, P and Q do not exist, and
there is no positive-growth solution (regime H2). In this way, there is a bifurcation at
ρ = ρ1 and ρ = ρ2, as depicted in Figure 11a. Indeed, at ρ = ρ2, the system changes from
regime H3 to regime H1, and at ρ = ρ1, the system changes from H2 to H3.
(ii) cˉk < cˆk. If ρ > ρ2 > ρ1, solutions P and Q are present, but Q is the only positive-
growth solution – P is a negative-growth solution – (regime H1). If ρ1 < ρ < ρ2, P and
Q both characterize negative-growth solutions (regime H3). Finally, if ρ < ρ1, P and Q
do not exist, and there is no non-zero-growth solution (regime H2). In this way, there
is a bifurcation at ρ = ρ1 and ρ = ρ2, as depicted in Figure 11b: at ρ = ρ2, the system
changes from regime H3 to regime H1, and at ρ = ρ1, the system changes from H2 to H3.
Appendix D. Local stability (θ = 0)
(i) Regime L.
At steady-state P , we have dPk = 0, thus, using Eqs. (28)-(29): Tr(J
P ) = cPk [1 + (g −
α)ycP ]− γP , and det(JP ) = −cPk γP [1 + (g−α)ycP ]. As g < α and ycP < 0, det(JP ) < 0,
namely there are two opposite-sign eigenvalues. Consequently, P is saddle-point stable.
At steady-state M , cMk > 0, d
M
k > 0 and γ
M = (1 − α)yMk − ρ = 0, namely
Tr(JM ) = cMk [1 + (g − α)ycM ]− (1− g)ydMdMk , and det(JM ) = −(1− α)cMk dMk ydM > 0.
As ycM < 0 and ydM < 0, we have det(JM ) > 0, and Tr(JM ) > 0, and there are two
positive eigenvalues. Consequently, M is locally unstable.
(ii) Regime H.
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First, let us consider the two solutions with positive economic growth. At steady-
states P and Q, we have dik = 0, thus: Tr(J
i) = cik[1 + (g − α)yci] − γi, and det(JP ) =
−cikγi[1 + (g − α)yci] for i = P,Q. Since DC i = 0, there is one negative eigenvalue
(λi1 = −γi) and one eigenvalue that changes sign, depending on the considered equilibrium
(λi2 = c
i
k[1 + (g − α)yci]). With yci = −ψyik/cik and cik = ρ − (g − α)yik at steady states
i = P,Q, we obtain λi2 := λ2(c
i
k) = c
i
k+ψ(c
i
k−ρ). Thus λi2(cˆk) = 0, where cˆk := ψρ/(1+ψ).
Since cQk < cˆk and c
P
k > cˆk, it follows that λ
Q
2 < 0 and λ
P
2 > 0. Consequently, P is
characterized by two opposite-sign eigenvalues and is locally determined (saddle-point
stable), while Q is characterized by two negative eigenvalues and is locally undetermined
(stable). Regarding point M , as γM = 0, we have: det(JM ) = −(1 − α)cMk dMk ydM > 0,
and Tr(JM) = cMk [1+ (g−α)ycM ]− (1− g)ydMdMk = −(1− g)ydMdk +(cMk − cˆk)/(1+ψ).
As cMk > cˆk, and yd
M < 0, it follows that Tr(JM) > 0, hence M is unstable. This analysis
generalizes the simple case of section 3.
Second, let us consider the two solution with negative economic growth. As λi1 =
−γi > 0, λQ2 < 0, and λP2 > 0, we deduce that P is indeterminable (stable) and Q is
saddle-point stable. Regarding point M , we still have det(JM ) > 0. As cMk < cˆk, the
trace Tr(JM ) can now change sign, depending on parameters, as proposition 5 states.
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